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events beyond its control while the shipowner- the only party
who has the means to prevent the accident -would go free.58
Wendell G. Lindsay, Jr.
CIVIL LAW PROPERTY - PARTITION OF LAND SUBJECT
TO A USUFRUCT
Plaintiff filed suit for partition by licitation of property
owned as follows: an undivided half interest was held in perfect
ownership by all eleven living heirs; one co-heir (a defendant)
had the usufruct of the other undivided interest while his eleven
co-heirs (including plaintiff) held the naked ownership thereof
in indivision. 2 Thus all the parties to the suit owned an un-
divided interest in imperfect and perfect ownership.. Dismissal
of plaintiff's suit was affirmed on appeal. Held, partition by
licitation of all interest cannot be forced by a proprietor who
holds shares of undivided perfect and naked ownership, if the
property, or an undivided portion thereof, is burdened with a
valid usufruct. Fricke v. Stafford, 159 So. 2d 52 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1963).
The Civil Code provides that anyone may demand partition
of a thing held in common.3 Determination of what constitutes
53. For the proposition that the shipowner has no right to indemnity in such
cases, see Hudson S.S. Co. v. Ayala Colon, 314 F.2d 44 (1st Cir. 1963) (per
curiam) ; Ray v. Compania Naviera Continental, S.A., 203 F. Supp. 206 (D. Md.
1962).
1. All references in this Note to partition mean partition by licitation. The
property in this suit, 225 acres of land, is not susceptible to the preferable par-
tition in kind which is governed by different rules. See Kaffie v. Wilson, 130
La. 350, 57 So. 1001 (1912).
2. The father, who died first, left a life usufruct to his youngest daughter,
subject only to his surviving spouse's legal usufruct, and the naked ownership
of his undivided interest in the community to the remaining children. When
the mother died, she left her undivided one-half ownership to all the children.
The property was held in indivision, though each heir had been sent into
possession. The court held that an attack on the usufruct on the grounds
that it impinged upon the legitime had prescribed. Fricke v, Stafford, 159 So. 2d
52 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1289 (1870) : "No one can be compelled to hold
property with another, unless the contrary has been agreed upon; any one has
a right to demand the division of a thing held in common, by the action of
partition."
Id. art. 1308: "The action of partition will not only lie between co-heirs and
co-legatees, but between all persons who hold property in common, from what-
ever cause they may hold in common. (As amended by Acts 1871, No. 87.)"
For the nearly identical article which is the basis of French doctrine and
cases on the subject, see FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 815(1).
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holding in common is the essential inquiry in ascertaining the
right to partition. It clearly means more than owning rights
in the same property.4 Ownership may be characterized by its
elements: the right to use (usus), the right to enjoyment
(fructus), and the right to alienate (abusus) .5 Ownership is
also categorized by its forms: perfect ownership, with the ele-
ments of usus, fructus, and abusus;6 usufruct, with usus and
fructus;7 and naked ownership, with abusus.8 Under the Lou-
isiana Civil Code and jurisprudence, holding in common means
at least holding the same form of ownership in the same prop-
erty. Thus perfect owners may force partition among perfect
owners;9 usufructuaries, among usufructuaries;'O and naked
owners, among naked owners." It seems equally clear that
whether holding in common refers to form or elements of own-
ership, naked owners and usufructuaries cannot force a parti-
tion between themselves since the forms are different and there
are no common elements. This is well established in Louisiana
by the landmark Smith v. Nelson' 2 case which refused to allow
the naked owner of an undivided one-half interest to force a
partition against one who held the usufruct over his interest
and perfect ownership of the remainder. To enable usufruc-
tuaries and naked owners to partition against perfect owners,
holding in common must be defined as holding the same ele-
ments of ownership in the property. In essence, this would be
recognition that perfect ownership (usus, fructus, and abusus)
is made up of severable components of usufruct (usus and
4. Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Reese, 195 La. 359, 196 So. 558 (1940);
Smith v. Nelson, 121 La. 170, 46 So. 200 (1908).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 491 (1870) : "[O]wnership gives the right to use,
to enjoy and to dispose of one's property in the most unlimited manner .. "
6. Id. art. 491: "Perfect ownership gives the right to use, to enjoy and
to dispose of one's property in the most unlimited manner. ... "
7. Id. art. 533: "Usufruct is the right of enjoying a thing . . . and to draw
from the same all the profit, utility and advantages which it may produce .. "
8. Id. art. 490: "On the contrary, ownership is imperfect, when it is to
terminate at a certain time or on a condition, or if the thing, which is the
object of it, being an immovable, is charged with any real rights toward a
third person; as a usufruct. .. ."
Id. art. 492: "Imperfect ownership only gives the right of enjoying and
disposing of property ... "
9. This situation would come under the general rule for partitions as set
out in id. art. 1289.
10. Id. art. 1309: "[U]sufructuaries of the same estate can institute among
themselves the action of partition."
11. Smith v. Nelson, 121 La. 170, 174, 46 So. 200, 201 (1908) : "There is no
doubt that, as between those in whom the naked ownership alone is vested, a
partition may be enforced . . . by licitation."
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 605 (1870) : "The owner may mortgage, sell or alienate
the thing subject to the usufruct, without the consent of the usufructuary. .. .
12. 121 La. 170, 46 So. 200 (1908).
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fructus) and naked ownership (abusus). Although no case
squarely holds that partition of common elements cannot be
forced between perfect and imperfect owners, there is language
in Smith v. Nelson13 indicating that a naked owner should not
be allowed to force a perfect owner to dismember his title and
lose the property involved from his estate forever. Both French
courts and commentators, however, recognize the right of im-
perfect and perfect owners to partition the elements of owner-
ship that they hold in common. 14 Thus usufructuaries may force
perfect owners to partition the usufruct (usus and fructus) even
though the perfect owners' interest would be converted into
naked ownership plus his share of the proceeds. Likewise, the
French recognize that naked owners may force partition of
naked ownership (abusus) against perfect owners; and perfect
owners may partition the elements in common against the usu-
fructuaries and naked owners or of the entire property by join-
ing all usufructuaries and naked owners. 15
In the instant case, plaintiff and all except one of the defend-
ants held undivided shares in naked ownership and in perfect
ownership while one of the defendants owned shares in perfect
ownership and in usufruct. The court, relying on Smith v.
Nelson, 6 held that there could be no partition. Since the plain-
tiff did not hold all forms of ownership held by defendants as
a group, the instant case is consistent with Smith v. Nelson if
that case stands for the proposition that to hold in common, co-
owners must hold the same form of ownership. Smith v. Nelson,
however, does not necessarily establish this proposition, since
even under the element criterion it would have been decided
the same way. The plaintiff (naked owner) in Smith v. Nelson,
who was seeking partition of the whole property, did not hold
all elements in common with the defendant (perfect owner and
usufructuary). The plaintiff in the instant case held the same
form -of ownership in common with others owning interest in
perfect and naked ownership; and, therefore, he should at least
13. Id. at 174, 46 So. at 201.
14. See 4 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS no
477 (1928) and 10 AUnRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAis n 621 big (6th ed.
1954), for both doctrine and cases. See also Buckner-Harmon Wood Contractor
v. Norris, 231 La. 37, 91 So. 2d 594 (1956) for analogous situation dealing with
separate timber estates; noted in 18 LA. L. REV. 31 (1958), with reference
to similar problem involved.
15. See note 14 supra.
16. Also cited by the court was Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Reese, 195
La. 359, 196 So. 558 (1940), in which the holders of a mineral lease to land
attempted to partition with the owners.
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be able to force partition of those interests.17  Had the court
recognized that holding in common referred to elements of own-
ership, the plaintiff would have been able to partition the entire
property since his interest in perfect ownership gave him ele-
ments in common with all co-owners including the usufructuary.
It is submitted that Louisiana courts should adopt the ele-
ment approach to holding in common. Partition is the most
logical solution to the intolerable management problems which
can arise when perfect owners and usufructuaries, each with
equal rights to use the property, 8 cannot agree as to the man-
ner in which the property is to be utilized. Under the element
criterion either the perfect ownership or usufructuary could
force partition of the usufruct. It is true that under the code
provision the same right of partition could not be denied the
naked owner even though there is no compelling management
consideration. In answer to the countervailing consideration
that perfect owners should not be forced to dismember their
titles, it may be observed that a perfect owner who desired to
avoid the dismemberment of his title resulting from partition
of the usufruct and naked ownership alone would be afforded
ample protection by his right to reconvene against naked own-
ers and usufructuaries for a partition of the entire property.
The French adoption of the element interpretation of holding
in common clearly indicates that this approach is available
under the Louisiana code provision.19 It is submitted that the
necessity for partition to resolve management conflicts makes
it clearly desirable that Louisiana adopt the concept that those
who possess the same elements of ownership hold in common.
Charles A. Snyder
CIVIL LAW PROPERTY- TACKING WITHOUT JURIDICAL LINK
Plaintiff sought to be declared owner of a 38-acre tract of
land by thirty years acquisitive prescription. His father ac-
17. See notes 9 and 11 supra.
18. The perfect owners, through LA. CIVIL CODE art. 491 (1870), and the
usufructuary, through id. art. 533, have the right to enjoy the full use of the
property to the extent of their interest.
19. But cf. id. art. 1303. An argument is also possible, though not accept-
able to the author, that the provision in id. art. 1309-"Thus, usufructuaries
of the same estate can institute among themselves the action of partition"-
is the only manner in which the usufructuary is able to partition, and thus is
a specific rejection of the element criterion.
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